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MERCIFUL JURIES: THE RESILIENCE OF JURY
NULLIFICATION
ALAN W. ScHmEiN*
JON M. VAN DYKE**
The power of a jury to soften the harsh commands of the law and
return a verdict that corresponds to the community's sense of moral justice
has long been recognized.' Widely disputed, however, is whether jurors
should be told they have this authority. Proponents have seen a right to a
jury nullification instruction as an inalienable part of the heritage of
democracy, 2 whereas opponents have argued that it is tantamount to anar-
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University. B.A. 1963, University of Virginia; J.D.
1966, George Washington University; LL.M. 1967, Harvard University; M.A. in Counseling
Psychology 1987, Santa Clara University.
** Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii.
B.A. 1964, Yale; J.D. 1967, Harvard University. The authors would like to thank Gerald W.
Berkley, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii, class of 1991, for
assistance with research on this article.
1. See, e.g., Lessard v. State, 719 P.2d 227, 231 (Wyo. 1986) (citing numerous other
cases).
The topic of "jury nullification" has been discussed in detail by the authors in their
previous writings: J. VAN DY , JURY SmCTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN ComAmrrm
To REPRESENTATIVE PA ELs 225-51 (1977); Scheflin & Van Dyke, JURY NUIICATIO: THE
CoNTOURs OF A CoTrovmsy, 43:4 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROa. 51 (1980); Scheflin, Jury
Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 So. CAL. L. Rav. 168 (1972); Van Dyke, The Jury as
a Political Institution, 16 CATr. LAW. 224 (1970); Van Dyke, 3 THE CENTER MAo. 17 (No.
2, March-April 1970).
2. Among those advocating giving jurors an honest instruction about their powers, in
addition to the authors in the articles cited supra in note 1 are: Timko, Jury Nullification
Thru the Initiative Process, in JURY NULLICATION VOL. I (1987); Becker, Jury Nullification:
Can A Jury Be Trusted?, 16 TRIAL 41 (Oct. 1980); Freeman, Why Not A Jury Nullification
Statute Here Too?, 131 Naw L.J. 304 (March 19, 1981); Kaufman, The Right of Self-
Representation and the Power of Jury Nullification, 28 CASE W. Rs. L. Rnv. 269 (1978);
Kunstler, Jury Nullification in Conscience Cases, 10 VA. J. INT'L L. 71 (1969); McCall,
Sentencing By Death Qualified Juries and the Right to Jury Nullification, 22 HARv. J. ON
Laois. 289 (1985); Osterman, Should Jurors Be Told They Can Refuse To Enforce The Law?:
Law Must Respect Consciences, 72 A.B.A. J. 36 (March 1986); Sax, Conscience and Anarchy:
The Prosecution of War Resisters, 57 YALE REv. 481 (1968); Schultz, Will 'Jury Nullification'
Save Ollie North?, 11 LEGAL TimEs 18 (March 6, 1989); Note, Jury Nullification and Jury-
Control Procedures, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 825 (1990); Note, Laws That Are Made to Be Broken:
Adjusting for Anticipated Noncompliance, 75 MICH. L. Rav. 687 (1977); Note, The Jury's
Role Under the Indiana Constitution, 52 INDIANA L.J. 793 (1977); Note, Toward Principles
of Jury Equity, 83 YALE L.J. 1023 (1974); Note, Jury Nullification: The Forgotten Right, 7
NEw ENO. L. Ray. 105 (1971).
Articles discussing jury nullification or the "dispensing power" of juries which provide
support for nullification but do not reach an explicit conclusion on whether an instruction
should be given include: Barkan, Jury Nullification in Political Trials, 31 SoC. PRos. 28 (Oct.
1983); Howe, Juries As Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARv. L. REv. 582 (1939); Jacobsohn,
A Right to Disagree: Judge, Juries, and the Administration of Criminal Justice in Maryland,
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chy.3 Although in the past judges did instruct jurors about their role,4 and
judges in Maryland and Indiana still do,5 most courts now refuse to explain
honestly to jurors that they have the ultimate power to decide whether it is
appropriate to apply the law to the facts presented to them.6
This judicial lack of candor has been periodically challenged; during
the past few years a persistent grass roots movement has developed to
promote the notion that our juries should be fully informed of their powers.
Information about jury nullification has been spreading to an increasingly
larger group of citizens and potential jurors. This movement serves to
illustrate the resilience of the "jury nullification" concept and its link to
fundamental notions of democracy.
This article discusses this new populist movement, analyzes some recent
court decisions, reports some of the significant developments related to jury
nullification during the past decade, and concludes that our judicial system
would be better served if judges instructed jurors of their true powers.7
WHAT'S IN A NAmE?
Persuaders have long been aware of the significance of what something
is called. For example, when President Ronald Reagan wanted financial and
other support for the "Contras" who were fighting the Sandanista govern-
ment in Nicaragua, he found it advisable to rename them "freedom fight-
1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 571; Kamins, Jury Nullification-A Rarity in Criminal-Law Practice, 194
N.Y.L.J. I (Aug. 20, 1985); Levine, The Legislative Role of Juries, 1984 A.B.F. REs. J. 605;
Myers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13 LAw & Soc. Ray.
781 (1979); Pacelle, Sanctuary Jurors' Dilemma: Law or Justice?, 8 AM. LAw. 95 (Sept. 1986).
3. Recent works arguing that such an instruction should not be given to the jurors
include: M. KADiSH & S. KADISH, DIscRETIoN To DisoBEY: A STUny OF LAWiFUL DEARTunns
FROM LEaAL Ruas (1973); Allen, Editorial: Nihilism at Santa Barbara, 57 A.B.A. J. 999 (Oct.
1971); Christie, Lawful Departures from Legal Rules: 'Jury Nullification' and Legitimated
Disobedience, 62 CAL. L. REv. 1289 (1974); Goldsmith, Jury Nullification and the Rule of
Law, 17 THE CoLo. LAw. 2151 (1988); Kadish & Kadish, On Justified Rule Departures by
Officials, 59 CAL. L. REv. 905 (1971); Marshall, Should Jurors Be Told They Can Refuse To
Enforce The Law?: Jurors Must Respect The Law, 72 A.B.A. J. 36 (March 1986); McBride,
The Jury is Not a Political Institution, 11 JuDGE'S J. 37 (April 1972); Scott, Jury Nullification:
An Historical Perspective on a Modern Debate, 91 W. VA. L. REv. 389 (1989); Simson, Jury
Nullification in the American System: A Skeptical View, 54 T-Er. L. REv. 488 (1976); Tavris,
The Law of An Unwritten Law: A Common Sense View of Jury Nullification, 11 WEST. ST.
L. REv. 97 (Fall 1983); Note, Jury Nullification in Historical Perspective: Massachusetts as a
Case Study, 12 StussoIx U.L. REv. 968 (1978); Comment, Jury Nullification and the Pro Se
Defense: The Impact of Dougherty v. United States, 21 U. KAN. L. REV. 47 (1972).
4. See Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 56-63.
5. Id. at 79-85.
6. Id. at 59-68.
7. We will not revisit the major arguments rejecting or supporting nullification. These
may be found in our prior work, see supra note 1, and in the work of others, see supra notes
2 and 3. Nor will we discuss two evolving questions: the application of jury nullification in
civil trials, and the expansion of jury powers to influence the admission of evidence. Our
focus in this article is on the emerging politics of the nullification debate as it shifts from the
courthouse to the statehouse and ballot box.
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ers," which had a patriotic and positive tone, rather than "Contras," a
term with negative connotations. Similarly, people who believe abortion is
immoral have stopped calling themselves "anti-abortionists," opting instead
for the more positive "pro-lifers."
Jury nullification debate similarly has been hampered by semantics. The
term "jury nullification" is widely used by commentators and will also be
used here by the authors, but it is not a term that accurately describes what
is being advocated. The jury power at issue here is not a power to "nullify"
statutes or precedents in order to create or substitute a new version of the
law.' Instead, it is a power to "complete" or "perfect" the law by permitting
the jury to exercise that one last touch of mercy where it may not be
appropriate and just to apply the literal law to the actual facts.
According to Professor George Fletcher, the term "jury nullification"
is unfortunate and misleading, because it suggests that when the
jury votes its conscience, it is always engaged in an act of disrespect
toward the law. The acquittal, supposedly, nullifies the law. In
place of the law, it is said, the jury interposes its own moral
judgment or political preferences.9
Fletcher rejects the view that jury nullification is an affront to the rule
of law, and he provides a healthier and more accurate image:
[Tihe function of the jury as the ultimate authority on the law [is]
not to "nullify" the instructions of the judge, but to complete the
law, when necessary, by recognizing principles of justification that
go beyond the written law. It would be better if we abandoned the
phrase "jury nullification" and spoke instead of the jury's function
in these cases of completing and perfecting the positive law recog-
nized by the courts and the legislature.' 0
If "jury nullification" originally had been called "jury mercy," some
of the emotional opposition might not have developed. Fletcher is correct
to observe that this opposition has been based on a sense that when juries
"nullify" they are acting extra-legally, outside the bounds of law. Under
this view, the act of "nullification" appears to stand in opposition to the
law.
8. Some opponents of jury nullification have argued that juries will have the power to
"ignore" or "disregard the law," or to return a verdict that may "fly in the face of both the
evidence and the law." Indeed, the more radical proponents like jury nullification for just
this reason. But this rhetoric does nullification a disservice. Lawless "Rambo" juries have no
place in the legal system; the supremacy of the rule of law is essential in a constitutional
democracy. Juries should not act as quasilegislators deciding which laws to eliminate or revise.
9. 0. FLETcHER, A Camm oF ShLF-DEPENsE: BERuEAaD Gorz= AND Tnm LAW ON TRIAL
155 (1988). The quote continues: "There are some who defend this residual power in juries
as the highest expression of democracy and community control over the machinery of the
state, and others who decry the same power as an invitation to anarchy." Id.
10. Id.
1991]
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Fletcher's perspective is more cordial. Jury nullification is not extra-
legal; quite the opposite. Nullification is an integral part of the law itself,
serving the unique and vital function of smoothing the friction between law
and justice, and between the people and their laws. Nullification then
becomes a tolerable, and occasionally beneficial, side-effect of the power
to return general verdicts of acquittal not subject to judicial review. Take,
for illustrative purposes, the case of Leroy Reed.
INSiDE THE JuRy RooM: WIscoNsIN V. LEROY REED"
Leroy Reed, a sincere but dull-witted convict on parole, was arrested
by his parole officer for illegal possession of a weapon. Reed enjoyed the
television detective program The Equalizer and thought he might like to
become a private investigator himself. Off went letters to mail-order detective
companies for brochures, books, and courses. Some of the information he
received stated he would need a gun. Reed obediently bought one, not fully
realizing that he was violating a condition of his parole. No one in the
courtroom doubted that Reed was only vaguely aware of what was going
on and that he had not caused harm, was not likely to cause harm, and
certainly did not have any intent to cause harm or violate rules. Punishing
him would be like rebuking.a five-year old for not knowing algebra. Under
the technical wording of the law, however, Reed was guilty. His defense
lawyer pleaded for a jury nullification instruction, but the trial judge called
it "an invitation to anarchy."
Once in the jury room, it was clear that the jurors were unanimous
about two things: that Reed was guilty under the law, but morally was
innocent. The just thing to do would be to acquit him. But the jurors had
been told they had to follow the letter of the law. What should they do?
During the spirited two-hour debate, some jurors argued that their oath
required them to convict even though it meant doing an injustice. Others
argued that they must follow what their consciences told them was the right
thing to do in this case.
Both sides, however, seemed upset that the law had left them in this
predicament. In the end, the conscience arguments converted the last re-
maining holdout. When he reluctantly retreated from his belief that the
jury had no moral leeway, a verdict was reached.
Leroy Reed was acquitted. Some jurors went home having less respect
for the legal system than when they had first reported for jury duty. Imagine
how much worse they would have felt upon learning that an honest jury
nullification instruction could have solved their dilemma and made them
proud and respectful of the legal process. Other jurors, however, when
11. The story of Leroy Reed is told in a remarkable television documentary where, for
the first time, television cameras were allowed to film an actual jury deliberating to verdict.
Inside the Jury Room (1986) was a segment of the PBS show Frontline. The film was written
and produced by Alan M. Levin and Stephen J. Herzberg.
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finally told about jury nullification, did not condemn the failure to receive
the instruction.12
The doctrine of jury nullification strikes a resonant chord in the
community. Professors Hans and Vidmar report on the results of a 1979
Canadian survey "where people were asked whether jurors should be
instructed that they are entitled to follow their own conscience instead of
strictly applying the law if it will produce a just result." 3 The survey
showed that
over three-quarters of the respondents said yes. Furthermore, people
who had actually served on a jury were even more supportive; 93%
of them endorsed the idea of giving these instructions. (On the
other hand, Canadian judges were overwhelmingly opposed: Fewer
than five percent agreed that jurors should receive such instruc-
tions.)14
Despite its popular appeal, judges in the United States, like their Canadian
counterparts, are not kind to arguments for nullification.
JuDicIAL DEcIsIoNS
The decisions concerning jury nullification during the past decade have
been relatively predictable, with most courts acting defensively and negatively
when litigants have requested a jury nullification instruction.15 The nullifi-
cation doctrine is raised by defendants with some regularity in cases of tax
protests, 6 abortion protests, 7 antinuclear protests, 8 and euthanasia, 9 but
it usually meets an icy judicial reception.
12. Law Professor Stephen J. Herzberg, co-producer of Inside The Jury Room, met
with the jurors immediately after the trial. He explained jury nullification to them and said
that they did have the right to return an acquittal. It was a highly emotional session. Many
of the jurors were crying. Herzberg, Inside the Jury Room, presented at the Bill of Jury
Rights Conference, St. Louis, Missouri (No. 10, 1990). The authors wish to thank Franklin
M. Nugent for an audiotape of Professor Herzberg's talk. The authors also wish to thank
Professor Herzberg for supplying us with additional information about the case and with a
videotape of his postverdict discussions with the jurors and the judge.
A case in which the failure to give a nullification instruction may have produced a
conviction is reported in Pacelle, supra note 2, at 95. According to Pacelle, many of the jurors
are still suffering from their experience.
13. V. HANs & N. VmiaR, JUDoNG nHm JuRY 158 (1986), (citing Doob, Public's View
of Criminal Jury Trial, and Doob, Canadian Trial Judges' View of the Criminal Jury Trial,
in LAw RE oRm CommissoN op CANADA SiTmiEs ON THE JuRY (1979)).
14. V. HANs & N. VmMAR, supra note 13, at 158.
15. See, e.g., Medley v. Commonwealth, 704 S.W.2d 190 (Ky. 1985); People v. St. Cyr,
341 N.W.2d 533 (Mich. App. 1983); State v. Perkins, 353 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. 1984); State v.
Maloney, 490 A.2d 772 (N.H. 1985); State v. Champa, 494 A.2d 102 (R.I. 1985).
16. See generally United States v. Krzyske, 836 F.2d 1013 (6th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Wiley, 503 F.2d 106 (8th Cir. 1974).
In United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233, 236 (10th Cir. 1980), Ogle, a tax protester, was
convicted of trying to influence potential jurors by supplying them with a "Handbook for
Jurors." The Handbook contained an inaccurate description of jury nullification ("it is
1991]
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One particularly illuminating example is State v. Ragland, 20 decided by
the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1986. The defendant, a prior convicted
felon, was charged with four separate crimes all stemming from the same
incident-(1) conspiracy to commit armed robbery, (2) unlawful possession
of a weapon, (3) unlawful possession of a weapon without a permit, and
(4) possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. The trial court severed
the last charge "to avoid the inevitable prejudice in the trial of the other
charges that would be caused by introducing defendant's prior felony
conviction, an essential element in the severed charge."
2
'
After the jurors found the defendant guilty of the first three charges,
the trial judge gave the jury the following instruction and asked them to
give their verdict on the fourth charge:
If you find that the defendant, Gregory Ragland, was previously
convicted for the crime of robbery and that he was in possession
of a sawed-off shotgun, as you have indicated ... then you must
find him guilty as charged by this Court.2
The defendant appealed on the ground that this instruction took from
the jurors their right to reach an independent verdict and, indeed, constituted
a "directed verdict" from the judge.
All seven justices on the New Jersey court agreed that the above
instruction was improper because the instruction included the "as you have
indicated" phrase. The court reasoned that the use of this phrase denied
the jury the power to evaluate the evidence anew to determine whether the
prosecutor had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had
violated the fourth charge.
The justices divided sharply, however, on whether the use of the word
"must" in this charge was proper, with four concluding that it was and
three arguing that it was not. The three judges in the minority argued that
the use of language such as "must" should be discontinued "because of its
potential to be interpreted in a manner that compromises jury independence
and blurs the accepted dichotomy between judge and jury."2'
unnecessary for jurors to follow the law of the land where they conceive of the law being
contrary to their concepts of morals").
17. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 716 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1983).
18. See, e.g., State v. Champa, 494 A.2d 102 (R.I. 1985).
19. See S. KASSIN & L. WRiGHTSmAN, TH As m cAN JuRY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PEaspncTlvs 157-58 (1988). Kassin and Wrightsman describe two 'euthanasia cases. In the
first, the jury acquitted. In the second, the jury convicted because, as one juror explained,
"We had no choice. The law does not allow for sympathy." Id. at 158.
In their book JUDoING Tan JuRy, supra note 13, Professors Hans and Vidmar observe
that euthanasia cases demonstrate the unique value served by jury nullification. In these cases,
"the legal authorities feel compelled to bring charges, but they rely on the jury's sense of
fairness to acquit the defendant." Td. at 158.
20. 105 N.J. 189, 519 A.2d 1361 (1986).
21. State v. Ragland, 105 N.J. 189, 192, 519 A.2d 1361, 1362 (1986).
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 220, 519 A.2d at 1377 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The majority opinion of Chief Justice Wilentz acknowledged that pre-
cedents are divided on this issue,u but argued in strongly emotional language
that "must" is an appropriate word to use because New Jersey juries do
not have a '.right' to announce a verdict of acquittal despite its determi-
nation of guilt." '2 Chief Justice Wilentz argued that no evidence exists that
jury nullification serves society well, 26 that an instruction to jurors about
their power "would confuse any conscientious citizen" 27 and produce "total
arbitrariness"' 2 and "cynicism," 29 and that a system that included a jury
nullification instruction would be "almost ludicrous." 30
Although Ragland remains the judicial norm, a decision that strikes a
dramatically different tone is Stevenson v. State,31 in which the Maryland
Court of Appeals reaffirmed the constitutionality of Article 23 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights, which states that:
In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of
Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction. 32
The majority's decision in this case also helps explain how this provision is
to be interpreted and applied.
Dorothy Lou Stevenson was convicted by a jury of murdering her
husband by pouring gasoline on him while he slept and then igniting the
gas with a match. At the beginning of the trial, the trial judge explained
to the jurors the unique jconstitutional role that juries play in Maryland
and, pursuant to Article 23, informed them that:
Under the Constitution of Maryland, [you are] the judge of the
law as well as of the facts. Therefore, anything which I may say
about the law, including any instructions which I may give you, is
The dissenting judges did not, however, advocate giving a jury nullification instruction. Id. at
221, 519 A.2d at 1378.
24. Id. at 198-99, 519 A.2d at 1365-66. One decision subsequent to Ragland that strikes
a very different tone and criticizes a trial juoge for confining a jury too narrowly is Cheek v.
United States, 59 U.S.L.W. 4049 (1991). The jury indicated that it felt constrained by "the
narrow and hard expression" of the law as given by the judge, id. at 4051 n.6, and the United
States Supreme Court agreed that the instruction was too strict, reversing and remanding for
a new trial.
25. Id. at 204, 519 A.2d at 1369.
26. Id. at 206, 519 A.2d at 1370.
27. Id. at 208, 519 A.2d at 1371.
28. Id. at 210, 519 A.2d at 1372.
29. Id. at 209, 519 A.2d at 1371.
30. Id. at 210, 519 A.2d at 1372.
31. 289 Md. 167, 423 A.2d 558 (1980). The majority opinion was written by Judge
Digges for himself and three other judges. Judges Eldridge and Davidson dissented, arguing
that Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights violates the 14th Amendment of the
United States Constitution. Id. at 194, 423 A.2d at 572. Judge Cole also dissented with regard
to the specific manner in which the instructions -were given in this case, reserving the question
of the status of Article 23 under the United States Constitution. Id. at 204, 423 A.2d at 577.
32. MD. CONST. DEcLARATioN OF RiGHTS art. 23.
1991]
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merely advisory and you are not in any way bound by it.33
After the evidence was presented, the judge did not again make such a
statement, but instead gave instructions on the issues of law and "couched
all of his remarks in mandatory language." ' 34 Mrs. Stevenson argued that
the preliminary instruction violated her right to due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and specifically
infringed upon her privilege against self-incrimination, the presumption of
innocence, and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
35
The majority opinion rejected these arguments and reaffirmed the
propriety of issuing the preliminary instruction under Article 23. It also
clarified exactly what the jury's power includes and thus responds to the
fears expressed by Chief Justice Wilentz in New Jersey. The Maryland
jury's role under Article 23 "is confined 'to resolvfing] conflicting interpre-
tations of the law [of the crime] and to decid[ing] whether th[at] law should
be applied in dubious factual situations,' and nothing more."'36
The Maryland jury's responsibility thus is to determine whether it is
equitable and just to apply the law defining a crime to the facts presented
to it. The jury has no role in determining whether evidence should be
admitted, whether witnesses are competent to testify, whether the court has
jurisdiction, or whether the statutes are constitutional.17 In summary, the
Maryland Court of Appeals stated:
Implicit in the decisions of this Court limiting the jury's judicial
role to the "law of the crime" is a recognition that all other legal
issues are for the judge alone to decide.
Because of this division of the law-judging function between
judge and jury, it is incumbent upon a trial judge to carefully
delineate for the jury the following dichotomy: (i) that the jury,
under Article 23, is the final arbiter of disputes as to the substantive
"law of the crime," as well as the "legal effect of the evidence,"
and that any comments by the judge concerning these matters are
advisory only; and (ii) that, by virtue of this same constitutional
provision, all other aspects of law (e.g., the burden of proof, the
requirement of unanimity, the validity of a statute) are beyond the
jury's pale, and that the judge's comments on these matters are
binding upon that body. In other words, the jury should not be
informed that all of the court's instructions are merely advisory;
rather only that portion of the charge addressed to the former areas
of "law" may be regarded as nonbinding by it, and it is only these
aspects of the "law" which counsel may dispute in their respective
33. Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167, 171, 423 A.2d 558, 560 (1980).
34. Id. at 171, 423 A.2d at 561.
35. Id. at 188, 423 A.2d at 569.
36. Id. at 179, 423 A.2d at 564 (emphasis in original) (quoting from Dillon v. State, 277
Md. 571, 581, 357 A.2d 360, 367 (1976) (emphasis in original)).
37. Id. at 178, 423 A.2d at 564.
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arguments to the jury. On the other hand, the jury should be
informed that the judge's charge with regard to any other legal
matter is binding and may not be disregarded by it."
In 1981, the Maryland Court of Appeals addressed this matter once again
and said that the jury's role in evaluating the law of the crime was limited
to those instances where the law is unclear or in dispute: "[I]n those
circumstances where there is no dispute nor a sound basis for a dispute as
to the law of the crime, the court's instructions are binding on the jury
and counsel as well."139
A subsequent case that illustrates the leeway still given to a jury in
Maryland is Mack v. State.4° The defendant in Mack was charged with
assault and battery and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of
violence. The trial court instructed the jurors that they had to find the
defendant guilty of a crime of violence (assault and battery) in order to
find him guilty of the second crime, which required a violent crime as a
prerequisite. The trial judge also informed the jury that this instruction was
binding. 41 Nonetheless, the jury found the defendant not guilty on the first
charge and guilty on the second. When the defendant challenged this decision
as inconsistent with the "binding" instructions, the trial judge ruled "that
the jury's verdict was 'in all probability, a compromise verdict' that could
stand. '42 The Court of Appeals accepted this illogical result as within the
jury's power and affirmed the verdict.
AN EMPnuCAL STUDY
The general judicial hostility to nullification ignores the popular senti-
ment for the doctrine and does not seem to be influenced by the data
suggesting that a nullification instruction would not spawn "runaway"
juries.
It is extremely difficult to develop definitive studies that illustrate how
a jury nullification instruction affects a jury's deliberation, but Professor
Irwin A. Horowitz of the University of Toledo Department of Psychology
attempted such a study recently. 43 Professor Horowitz sought to study
38. Id. at 179-80, 423 A.2d at 565.
39. Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84, 89, 437 A.2d 654, 657 (1981). In Allnutt v. State,
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals noted that:
Instances of dispute of the law of the crime are an endangered species rapidly
approaching'extinction. Once an appellate court has ruled on the "law of the crime,"
the matter then becomes settled law, and thereafter the jury is no longer the judge
of the law with respect to that particular matter. Consequently, disputes of the law
of the crime will decrease in number with each successive appellate ruling.
59 Md. App. 694, 703, 478 A.2d 321, 325 (1984).
40. 300 Md. 583, 479 A.2d 1344 (1984).
41. Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 600, 479 A.2d 1344, 1352 (1984).
42. Id.
43. See Horowitz, The Effect of Jury Nullification Instruction on Verdicts & Jury
Functioning in Criminal Trials, 9 L. & HuM. BEHAv. 25 (1985); Horowitz, Jury Nullification:
The Impact of Judicial Instructions, Arguments, and Challenges on Jury Decision Making, 12
LAW & Hum. BEHAv. 439 (1988).
1991]
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"whether the jury functioned differently if it was given nullification instruc-
tions; whether the impact of such instructions depended on the precise form
in which they were given; and whether their impact also depended on the
type of case in which they were given." 44
Horowitz assembled forty-five six-person juries, drawing names from
the official jury pool used in Toledo, Ohio. 41 He then chose three different
factual situations and asked fifteen of the juries to evaluate each of three
situations presented with professionally-acted audio tapes and slides. The
cases involved (1) the murder of a grocer during a robbery attempt, (2) the
killing of a pedestrian by a drunk college student driving in a foggy night,
and (3) the "mercy" killing of a terminally ill and suffering cancer patient
by a sympathetic nurse who had the consent of the patient and her family.
The fifteen juries were in turn broken into groups of five and each
group was given one of three jury instructions: (a) a standard instruction
taken from the Ohio Pattern Juror Instructiofis, which does, not make any
reference to nullification; (b) the Maryland Instruction, which contains
nullification language; 46 and (c) what Professor Horowitz characterizes as a
"radical" nullification instruction, taken from one of the present authors'
earlier articles. 47 The result was that all fifteen of the juries convicted the
alleged murderer of the grocer despite the three different instructions they
received, but variations occurred in their evaluations of the other two fact
situations. Two of the five juries that received the "standard" and "Mar-
yland" instructions acquitted the drunk college student but none of those
receiving the "radical" instruction reached a verdict of acquittal. And in
44. V. HAs & N. VmDIAR, supra note 13, at 159 (describing studies of Professor Irwin
Horowitz). The quote ends "The answer he got was yes to all three questions." Id.
45. All 170 participants had previously served as jurors in Ohio courts. Horowitz (1985),
supra note 43, at 30.
46. The instruction used by Professor Horowitz was as follows:
Members of the Jury, this is a criminal case and under the Constitution and laws
of the State of Maryland in a criminal case the jury are the judges of law as well
as the facts in the case. So that whatever I tell you about the law while it is intended
to be helpful to you in reaching a just and proper verdict in the case, it is not
binding upon you as members of the jury and you may accept or reject it. And you
may apply the law as you apprehend it to be in the case.
Horowitz (1985), supra note 43, at 29 (quoting Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 83,
quoting Wyley v. Warden, 372 F.2d 742, 743 n.1 (4th Cir. 1967)).
47. The instruction is taken from Van Dyke (1970), supra note 1.
Jurors were told the following:
1. "Although they are a public body bound to give respectful attention to the laws,
they have the final authority to decide whether or not to apply a given law to the
acts of the defendant on trial before them";
2. That 'they represent (the community) and that it is appropriate to bring into their
deliberations the feelings of the community and their own feelings based on con-
science';
3. And, jurors were told that despite their respect for the law, "nothing would bar
them from acquitting the defendant if they feel that the law, as applied to the fact
situation before them, would produce an inequitable or unjust result."
Horowitz (1985), supra note 43, at 30-31.
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the "mercy" killing case, one of the five "standard" juries acquitted the
nurse, two of the "Maryland" juries acquitted, and four of the "radical"
juries acquitted.s
Although the sample Horowitz used is small and more work clearly is
required, this study does show that juries told that they have power are
more likely to exercise it and to reach results that-at least in these cases-
appear to be more just and equitable. 49
FRoM THE JUDICIAL TO m PoLrricAIAL ARENA
The controversy over the propriety of a jury nullification instruction
lay dormant for most of this century until resurrected in the 1960s as part
of the defense strategy in anti-Vietnam War demonstration trials ° As
mentioned above, it did not meet with a warm judicial reception, and most
judges still refute to instruct juries honestly about their nullification power.
Such refusal in the 1960s did not significantly undermine the legitimacy of
the judiciary because few people knew about nullification. This is no longer
true in the 1990s. The jury nullification movement is more active now than
at any previous period. Journalists have noted that juries have appeared to
invoke their nullification power in many prominent recent cases.51 More
48. Horowitz, supra note 43, at 32.
49. Kassin & Wrightsman identify two potential problems arising from the Horowitz
study. First, "jury nullification is like a door that can swing both ways. Just as it can license
jurors to acquit the guilty, it is argued, it can enable them to convict those who are innocent."
S. KAsswr & L. WmaoarsmAN, supra note 19, at 161. Carefully worded jury instructions should
all but eliminate this possibility. Even if such a conviction occurred, it could be reversed. Jury
convictions, unlike jury acquittals, are not final.
The second concern is that when the jury nullification instruction is made explicit, jurors
will become "diverted from the external to the internal, from the evidence onto their
sentiments." Id. at 161. It seems more likely to us that jurors will deal more openly and
honestly with their sentiments, but would not be "diverted" from their initial task of finding
the true facts.
50. Credit goes to Professor Sax for rekindling the flame of jury nullification. See Sax,
supra note 2.
51. Among the recent highly publicized trials where jury nullification appears to have
played a role are those of Mayor Marion Barry of Washington, D.C., for durg use, Oliver
L. North for his role in the Iran-Contra Affair, and Bernhard Goetz for his assault in a New
York City subway.
After Mayor Barry's jury returned a conviction for a relatively minor charge and acquittals
on the other counts, the trial judge Thomas Penfield Jackson spoke at Harvard Law School
and expressed his dismay that the jurors had failed to return more convictions even though
the evidence was "overwhelming" on at least a dozen counts. Bruce Fein then wrote a column
chastising Judge Jackson for his "acid carping at jurors for nullifying the law." Fein, Judge,
Jury... and the Sixth, Wash. Times, Nov. 8, 1990, at G3. Judge Jackson had said:
The jury is not a minidemocracy or a minilegislature. They are not to go back and
do right as they see fit. That's anarchy. They are supposed to follow the law.
Commentator Fein responded by saying:
Jury nullification in a particular case is no more a legislative repeal of a criminal
law, or anarchy, than are the commonplace decisions of prosecutors to resist
prosecutions where the crime is deemed inconsequential or mitigated by special
1991]
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significantly, frustration with the judicial system, and in particular the
perception that judges are dishonest with juries, has caused proponents of
jury nullification to seek satisfaction from two more hospitable forums-
voters and legislators.
Voters and Legislators
Debate about jury nullification raises fundamental, and unanswered,
questions about sovereignty in a constitutional democracy. It was therefore
natural that nullification proponents would seek out the two major forums
for lawmaking, the popular vote and legislation.
In the summer of 1989, Larry Dodge, a Montana businessman, joined
with his friend Don Doig to found the Fully Informed Jury Association
(FIJA). This "national nonprofit nonpartisan group [is] dedicated to jurors
being fully informed of their rights." ' 52 Within eighteen months, the organ-
ization had jury rights lobbyists in thirty-five states.5 3
FIJA sponsored the first Bill of Jury Rights Conference in November
1990. The purpose of the gathering was to plan strategy to lobby legislators
to enact "fully informed jury" statutes, and to urge voters to pass initiatives,
referenda, or constitutional amendments to protect the heritage of the jury's
right of nullification. 54 The Conference concluded with a ceremony at the
federal courthouse to kickoff a national Jury Rights Campaign.
Because public sentiment supports jury nullification, 5 FIJA's appeal
spans the political and social spectrum:
Conservatives and constitutionalists, liberals and progressives, lib-
ertarians, populists, greens, gun owners, peace groups, taxpayer
rights groups, home schoolers, alternative medicine practitioners,
drug decriminalization groups, criminal trial lawyers, seat belt and
helmet law activists, environmentalists, women's groups, anti-nu-
circumstances.
Id.; see also Thompson, Sifting the Pool; Juror Questionnaires Explore Drug Addiction,
Prejudice, Wash. Post, June 5, 1990, at Al.
The jury in Oliver North's trial similarly returned a verdict that indicated sympathy with
the accused, convicting him on only three of the twelve charges against him. Georgetown
University Law Professor Paul F. Rothstein analyzed the trial by saying: "It's jury nullifica-
tion .... The instructions on aiding and abetting left [the jurors] little choice, but I think
they sort of vaguely felt in their minds that his superiors ordered it and he was in a bind ......
Strasser, Jury in North's Trial Settled on the Concrete; Abstractions Rejected, Nat'l L.J., May
15, 1989, at 9; see also Schultz, supra note 2.
Regarding the Goetz case and jury nuilificaiton, see G. FLETCHER, supra note 9; Pinsley,
Goetz Appeal Explores Jury Nullification Issue, Manhattan Lawyer, Nov. 1, 1988, at 11; April
5, 1987, sec. 4, at 6, col. 1.
52. FULLY INFoRmED JuRY ASSOCIATION, MEDIA HADouT 2 (Oct. 30, 1990).
53. Adler, Courtroom Putsch?, Wall St. J., Jan. 4, 1991, at Al, col. 1.
54. FIJA has many other jury reform proposals besides the nullification issue. Discussion
of them is beyond the scope of this paper.
55. See sources cited supra note 13.
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clear groups, ethnic minorities, ... and judges (yes, some judgeg
are sympathetic).m
As of January 1991, FIJA had successfully persuaded legislators to introduce
bills in the state legislatures of Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mas-
sachusetts, New York, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Wyoming. 7
These bills differ widely in language. One of the more interesting options
is the Massachusetts bill, introduced by Senator Robert L. Hedlund, 8 which
seeks to soften the confrontation between the legislature and the judiciary.
Senator Hedlund has strong feelings about its importance: "I see this bill
as supporting one of the two pillars of freedom-the right to a fully
informed jury. The other pillar is the right to vote."159 If passed, the bill
will amend the handbook all potential trial jurors receive and would add a
new segment to the video presentation they watch. Senator Hedlund's bill
states:
In informing the jurors of the nature and extent of their duties and
responsibilities... the handbook shall inform the jurors that in all
cases they have the historical, constitutional, and natural right to
judge not only the liability, guilt, or innocence of the defendant(s)
under the law as charged, but to exercise their conscience in doing
so and that, if they determine according to their conscience that
the law as charged by the judge is unjust or wrongly applied to the
defendant(s), it is their obligation, right, and duty to judge according
to their conscience.
By its wording, the bill would apply both to civil and criminal jury
trials. Application of jury nullification in civil cases is less pressing an issue
because the judge always maintains the authority to alter or reject the
verdict. Thus, a jury that votes its conscience can be judicially reversed.
Discussions of jury nullification in the context of civil cases thus tend to
be rare.6°
Senator Hedlund's bill contains one great virtue and one great vice. Its
virtue is that it attempts to avoid a direct confrontation with judges and
therefore does not order them to instruct juries about their nullification
56. Tan FIJAcrivisT 1 (Special Outreach Issue, 1990).
57. Some of these bills, such as the ones in Arizona and Wyoming, have been defeated.
Others remain to be debated.
58. The authors would like to thank David J. Shagoury, aide to Senator Hedlund, for
helpful discussions about jury nullification.
59. Telephone interview with Massachusetts Senator Robert L. Hedlund (January 28,
1991). The authors would like to thank Senator Hedlund for providing us with additional
information about his bill.
60. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Indus. Co., Ltd., 478 F. Supp. 889
(E.D. Pa. 1979); V. HAs & N. V~mAR, supra note 13, at 160-63; Scheflin & Van Dyke,
supra note 1, at 69-71.
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power. The jurors will receive accurate information from their handbook,
and judges will not be compelled to give it to them.6'
The one great vice in the bill is that it makes a statement of jury power
that is far too broad. Under its terms, for example, a jury could convict
on the basis of conscience if the jurors feel the law is too soft or lenient.
The bill needs to be amerided to remove that impression. Language must
be added to convey to the jury that it may exercise its conscience or
"mercy" power only for leniency. No defendant may be judged by a
standard harsher than the law on the books. Ex post facto convictions are
unacceptable.
Another illustration of the breadth of the bill's language is to b'e found
in the sentence that permits jurors to exercise conscience if the law as
charged by the judge "is unjust or wrongly applied" to the defendant(s).
It would be better to say that jurors, in the exercise of their consciences,
"may acquit the defendant if the application of the law, as given by the
judge, would result in an unjust conviction."
Having jurors speculate on the "justness" of a law is to distract them
from their central task of applying the facts to the law in that particular
case. If a law is unjust, its application in any case is unjust, and voters,
legislators, or judges should remove it from the books. Juries do not have
this power. Their power is limited to refusing to apply the law in the single
case presented to them, and then only when following the technical mandate
of the law would offend the community's sense of justice.
Senator Hedlund's bill undoubtedly will undergo language changes as
it moves through the legislative process. In rewritten form, it may serve as
a model for laws that truly make our nation a "government of the people,
by the people and for the people."
Legislation has not been the only path to jury nullification law reform.
FIJA has been busy circulating petitions for ballot initiatives in many states,
including Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Montana, Utah,
and Washington. In some of these states, amendments to the state consti-
tutions are sought. By the end of 1991, FIJA hopes to have electoral
campaigns in all fifty states.
One of the most elaborate jury nullification provisions appeared as an
initiative to amend the Oregon Constitution: 3
It is the natural right of every citizen of the state of Oregon, when
serving on a criminal-trial jury, to judge both the law and the facts
61. With this silver lining, however, comes a dark cloud. If judges do not give nullification
instructions, or, worse yet, give a strong statement that jurors must follow the judge's
instructions, jurors may rightly become confused about their role. Some judicial cooperation
inevitably will be necessary.
62. A. Lincoln, Address at Gettysburg (Nov. 19, 1863).
63. Oregon's Constitution presently recognizes a right of jury power. Article I section
16 provides "In all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the law,
and the facts under the direction of the court as to the law, and the right of new trial, as in
civil cases." ORE. CoNsT. art. I, § 16.
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pertaining to the case before the jury, in order to determine whether
justice will be served by applying the law to the defendant. It is
mandatory that all jurors be informed of this right. Before the jury
hears a case, and again before jury deliberation begins, the court
shall inform the jurors of their rights in these words: "As jurors,
your first responsibility is to decide whether the prosecution has
proven beyond reasonable doubt every element of the criminal
charge. If you decide that the prosecution has proven beyond
reasonable doubt every element of the criminal charge but that you
cannot in good conscience support a guilty verdict, you are not
required to do so. To reach a verdict which you believe is just,
each of you has the right to consider to what extent the defendant's
actions have actually caused harm or otherwise violated your sense
of right and wrong. If you believe justice requires it, you may also
judge both the merits of the law under which the defendant has
been charged and the wisdom of applying that law to the defendant.
Accordingly, for each charge against the defendant, even if review
of the evidence strictly in terms of the law would indicate a guilty
verdict, you have the right to find the defendant not guilty. The
court cautions that with the exercise of this right comes the full
moral responsibility for the verdict you bring in." As part of their
oath, the jurors shall affirm that they understand the information
concerning their rights which this section requires the court to give
them, and that no party to the trial may be prevented from
encouraging jurors to exercise this right. For the jurors to be so
informed is declared to be part of the defendant's fundamental
right to trial by jury, and failure toconduct any criminal trial in
accordance with this section shall not constitute harmless error, and
shall be grounds for a mistrial. No potential juror may be disqual-
ified from serving on a jury because he or she expresses willingness
to judge the law or its application, or to vote according to his or
her conscience.
As the Oregon Supreme Court succinctly stated, this initiative, if adopted,
"%Yould enshrine in the Oregon Constitution the concept of 'jury nullifica-
tion."'" The Court expressed hostility toward the initiative,65 but did not
strike it down. -
JURDmicAL DIsHoEmsTY
Essential to the success of the grass roots jury nullification movement
is publicity. People need to be informed about the right to fully informed
64. Fauvre v. Roberts, 309 Ore. 691, 694, 791 P.2d 128, 130 (1990).
65. The Court ruled against proponents of the initiative who were challenging the wording
of the description of the provision in the Attorney General's certification of the ballot title.
Id. at 696, 791 P.2d at 132.
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juries. Jury nullification makes news in most major criminal trials where a
clash of values attracts public attention. Articles about jury nullification
now appear in newspapers and magazines with great frequency. When the
Public Broadcast System (PBS) aired Inside the Jury Room, an estimated
twenty-five million viewers saw the program. 6 Jury nullification is getting
more press coverage than ever before. Millions of people are learning what
the judges refuse to tell them.
Contacting Potential Jurors
Press coverage has the advantage of reaching many people, but it does
so at a time in their lives when the jury nullification issue is not very
pressing. For potential jurors, however, information about jury nullification
may have a more direct impact on the juror's deliberations.
On January 25, 1990, the San Diego Reader published a three-quarter
page advertisement 67 with the following headline:
ATTENTION JURORS & FUTURE JURORS
You Can Legally Acquit Anti-Abortion
"Trespassers" Even If They 're "Guilty"
The advertisement began by saying "[sluppose you're on the jury in
the trial of pro-life 'rescuers' who blocked the entrances to an abortion
facility. The judge will probably tell you it makes no difference whether
you agree with their actions .... He's Not Telling the Truth." The text
went on to praise a Philadelphia jury that had used its "common-law right
to 'nullify"' a trespass law.
The timing of the appearance of the advertisement was well planned.
Trials were beginning for Operation Rescue defendants accused of trespass
and other offenses at the site of a medical clinic. That the advertisement
was designed to influence jury verdicts cannot be in doubt. Indeed, the
publisher of The Reader was one of the defendants and his lawyer told the
press that he was aware the advertisement would be run.6s
Three weeks before the San Diego advertisement appeared, leaflets were
distributed outside the courthouse in El Cajon, California. The demonstra-
tors stopped when warned by the marshal that they could be arrested for
felony jury-tampering. To combat the information being handed out, judges
gave jurors special instructions to disregard the leaflets.
66. Herzberg, supra note 12.
67. At the bottom right of the advertisement there is a small box, labelled "ATTENTION
LAWYERS," which contains a reference to our article in 43:4 LAw & CoNmiEM. PROB. 52(1980). Neither of us was contacted before this reference was used. Statements in the adver-
tisement are in direct contradiction to our position. We categorically and emphatically do not
endorse jurors lying to judges nor do we endorse telling jurors to disbelieve everything they
hear from judges.
68. See Jackson, DA's Office Decries 'Jury Nullification' Ad, San Diego Union, Jan.
26, 1990, at BI.
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California was not the first location where such leaflets appeared.
Operation Rescue adherents in Jackson, Mississippi distributed leaflets urg-
ing jurors to "nullify every rule or 'law' that is not in accordance with the
principles of Natural, God-given, Common, or Constitutional Law." 69
Many of these leaflets present a distorted and incorrect discussion of
nullification. Potential jurors who read them may taint the deliberations of
actual juries with misinformation. Only an accurate jury nullification in-
struction from the judge can eliminate this problem.
In fact, many of the pamphlets and leaflets go further than presenting
misinformation. They suggest or hint that potential jurors should deceive
judges.
Should Jurors Be Honest With Judges?
Sir Walter Scott wrote the much quoted phrase, "Oh! what a tangled
web we weave [w]hen first we practise to deceive!" ' 70 Proponents of jury
nullification have written about the lack of candor involved when the judge
fails to tell the jury about nullification. This dishonesty now has spawned
a more virulent deception in the reverse direction: jurors lying to judges.
In 1988, the authors received a four-page pamphlet entitled "The
Informed Juror." Written by Paul deParrie and sponsored by an Oregon
group called Advocates for Life, the pamphlet gives a very brief description
of nullification before calling on conservatives, "especially Christians," to
refrain from showing during voir dire that they have strong feelings about
abortion. The pamphlet's author advises:
During jury selection it may be wise to refrain from elaborating on
answers to questions asked by attorneys. Any appearance of being
educated, involved or opinionated may be sufficient cause to be
rejected, thus being removed from the opportunity to be a watchman
for abuses by the executive and judicial departments of government.
This does not mean that you would be untruthful in answering
questions. Simply keep your answers brief if you would like to
improve your chances of serving on a jury.
Not all anti-abortion activists have been content with silence or brevity.
For some, outright deception appears justified. One such illustration sur-
faced in San Diego where a published advertisement stopped just short of
advocating lying.7' Noting that "before you even get on the jury, they may
ask you whether you know about your right to 'nullify,"' the advertisement
then offered a suggested response:
69. The authors thank Jerry Mitchell, reporter for the Jackson, Mississippi Clarion-
Ledger, for sending us the leaflet. This particular leaflet was sponsored by the Christian Action
Group of Jackson, Mississippi.
70. Sm WALrE ScoTT, Marmion, Canto VI, Stanza 17, in ComPxrm PomzcAL WoRms
145 (1900).
71. See supra text at note 65.
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Don't believe a word they say....
Here's How to Do It
It's easy. The most important rule is, don't let the judge and
prosecutor know that you know about this right.
It is unjust and illegal for them to deny you this right. So, if
you have to, it's perfectly all right for you to make a "mental
reservation."
Give them the same answer you would have given if you were
hiding fugitive slaves in 1850 and the 'slave catchers' asked if you
had runaways in your attic. Or if you were hiding Jews from the
Nazis in Germany.
This recommendation for "pious dishonesty" was then followed by two
other suggestions:
The second rule is, educate the other jurors about jury nullifi-
cation and, if possible, persuade them to vote "not guilty."
The third rule is stick to your guns. Don't let other jurors make
you change your position.
Millions of potential jurors may be exposed to similar advertisements,
leaflets, or pamphlets. That means that countless juries may contain mem-
bers who have concealed their awareness of nullification, who hold seriously
incorrect views about it, and who intend to "educate" the other jurors to
rebuff laws they do not like.
When jury nullification was a judicial secret, it was easier to refuse to
give jury nullification instructions. 72 Such refusal today, however, may
seriously compromise the justice of our jury verdicts.
Should Judges Be Honest With Jurors?
What should the judge do about the fact that jurors may know
something about nullification, accurate or not? Suppose, for example, we
have a panel of potential jurors in a criminal case that has attracted media
attention. Some of these jurors have seen literature about a right to nullify
laws. What they read contained many errors. The defense lawyer or pros-
ecutor may request to ask questions about nullification on voir dire. Should
the lawyers be allowed to voir dire about nullification? If not, these jurors
will contaminate the jury deliberations. If so, information about nullification
will be made public. The judge may decide to give an antinullification
72. Larry Dodge has reported a case from New York in which one of the jurors began
to explain jury nullification to the others, but they sent a note to the judge about him. The
judge permitted him to continue to deliberate after telling him to "keep his politics out of the
case and apply the law as given." The juror agreed, went back to the deliberations, and hung
the jury. He was later threatened with perjury and contempt charges, but they were never
brought. Dodge, A Complete History of the Power Rights and Duties of the Jury System, a
talk delivered at the State of the Nation Conference, sponsored by the Texas Liberty Association
(July 7, 1990).
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instruction, but this, of course, will reinforce what the literature said would
happen and would not correct any errors about the doctrine.
Judicial failure to give honest and correct instructions on nulfification
may thus directly contribute to contamination of jury deliberations. It is a
sad irony that while judges continue to refuse to give accurate jury nulli-
fication instructions, they in fact are creating the anarchy they seek to
avoid.
CONCLUSION
The renewed grass roots interest in a "fully informed jury" reinforces
our earlier views that judges should give jurors an accurate and 'honest
instruction about the jury's role and power. The instruction should state
that the judge must properly make rulings on procedural matters and will
be guiding the trial so that all constitutional protections are provided to the
litigants. The instruction should also say that the jury does not have the
power to create new statutes or evaluate the constitutionality of the statutes
before them. The jury should be encouraged to pay respectful attention to
the acts of the legislature which, after all, reflect the democratic wishes of
the community's majority. But the jurors should also be told that their
function is to represent the community in this trial and that their ultimate
responsibility is to determine the facts that occurred and to evaluate whether
applying the law to these facts will produce, in the eyes of the community,
a just and equitable verdict.
This type of honest instruction would reinforce our nation's commitment
to a government where the people are sovereign, and it would serve to bring
the people and their laws together in closer harmony.
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